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Case No. 20070159-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Ryan Leon Draper, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from three convictions for forgery. This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A~4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging a witness's opinion 
identifying Defendant's handwriting and in not calling a handwriting analyst? 
Standard of Review. "In ruling on an ineffective assistance claim following 
a[r]ule 23B hearing, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact, 
but review[s] its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 
546, Tf 13,128 P.3d 556 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted). 
2. Whether the Court should presume the sufficiency of the evidence where 
Defendant has failed to marshal the crucial fact in support of the verdict? 
Standard of Review. A reviewing court will decline to address the merits of a 
claim of insufficient evidence where defendant notably failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict. State v. Sheplterd, 1999 UT App 305, f 25, 
989 P.2d 503. Assuming the Court does address Defendant's insufficiency claim, 
"' [it] review [s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict, [and it] reverse [s] . . . only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted/" State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, 
1f 15,167 P.3d 503 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE, A N D RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (WestSupp. 2008). 
(1) As used in this section, / /writing , / includes printing, electronic 
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording valuable 
information including forms such as: 
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(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or 
identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing 
issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or 
writing representing an interest in or claim against property, or a 
pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or 
with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters 
the altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication, or utterance: 
(i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent; 
(ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party with 
the authority of that other party; or 
(iii) purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when an original did not exist. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if 
an actor signs his own name to the writing if the actor does not have 
authority to make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, 
publish, or utter the writing on behalf of the party for whom the actor 
purports to act. 
(4) Forgery is a third degree felony. 
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Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in 
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or 
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as 
the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other 
principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold 
showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or 
data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if 
the principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, 
including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their 
application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the 
relevant expert community. 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of 
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or 
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: 
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(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge. Testimony that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to 
the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired 
for purposes of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the 
trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been 
authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, 
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances. 
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard 
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or 
recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under 
circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by 
evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by 
the telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the 
case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the 
person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, 
the call was made to a place of business and the conversation related to 
business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence that a writing authorized 
by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public 
office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data 
compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this 
nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient Documents or Data Compilation. Evidence that a 
document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as 
to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place 
where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 
years or more at the time it is offered. 
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(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system 
used to produce a result and showing that the process or system 
produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of 
authentication or identification provided by court rule or statute of this 
state. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three counts of forgery, all third degree felonies, 
and three counts of theft by deception, all class B misdemeanors (R.7-10). After a 
preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over on all charges (R.28-29). 
Following a one-day trial, Defendant moved to dismiss all charges for lack of 
evidence (R. 141:90). The trial court denied the motion (R141:92). The jury 
convicted Defendant of three forgery counts and acquitted him of the three theft by 
deception counts (R.113-16). Following preparation of a presentence investigation 
report, the court sentenced Defendant to three concurrent terms of zero-to-five-years 
in the State prison, suspended the prison terms, ordered him to serve forty-five days 
in jail, and placed him on probation for thirty-six months (R. 117; R. 124-26). 
Defendant retained his current appellate counsel and filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R. 133-34). Appellate counsel filed a motion to remand the case to the trial 
court for supplementation of the record on appeal and for the entry of findings of 
fact, pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (R. 145-68). He 
alleged that his trial counsel, Mr. Roger A. Kraft, was ineffective because he (1) 
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failed to present at trial a handwriting expert to counter the lay opinion testimony 
offered by the State concerning Defendant's authorship of the forged documents; 
and (2) failed to challenge the adequacy of the foundation laid for the lay opinion 
offered by the State's witness (R. 151-68). 
This Court remanded the case "for an evidentiary hearing for the limited 
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the determination of whether trial 
counsel's actions in failing to call an expert witness constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel" (Order, R. 143, Addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court made findings of fact (R. 265-67, "Findings," Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's case at trial 
Defendant was a technician who worked for Air Comfort, a heating and air 
conditioning company (R. 141:36,56-57,62). He made house calls when people had 
problems with heating or air conditioning and called for an appointment (R. 141:11-
12,24-25,43-44). He would begin a job with a partially completed invoice, or work 
order, detailing the appointment and complete the invoice when the job was done to 
reflect the work performed and what was charged, and then return the top copy of 
the completed document together with any non-cash payment from the customer to 
Nicole Matheny at Air Comfort the day after completing the job (R. 141:58-59,76-78, 
80). Cash payments were to go directly to Wanda Brett in accounting and required 
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the signature and initials of the technician and the initials of the accountant, 
dispatcher, or service coordinator who received it from the technician, with the 
paperwork ultimately going to Nicole (R. 141:59-61, 83-84). The customer would 
receive a carbon copy of the invoice, and two other copies would be used for record 
keeping within the company (R. 141:59). 
First Forgery. 
On April 30, 2005, Defendant went to the home of Vance Hansen to fix his 
furnace thermostat (R. 141:24-25, 31-32). The total cost for the visit was $67.04, 
which Hansen paid to Defendant in cash before signing the written invoice (R. 
141:26-28,32-33, 62-63; State's Exh. 5). Thereafter, Air Comfort received an invoice 
for the job showing a different invoice number, a total charge of $ 35.00, Defendant's 
initials, and a signature that appeared to be that of Vance Hansen, but was not (R. 
141:28-30, 33-34, 61-62; State's Exh. 6). This invoice had the required initials or 
signatures indicating that $35.00 in cash was received (R. 141:61-63). Cory Hansen, 
client fulfillment director for Air Comfort, confirmed Defendant's signature from 
the handwriting on the invoice (R. 141:56, 62). The initials, "N.M.," for "Nicole 
Mathis" also were on the invoice (R. 141:63). 
Second Forgery. 
In June 2005, Defendant went to the home of Brenda Dunyon and fixed her air 
conditioner (R. 141:11-13). The final cost for the repair was $183.55, and Dunyon 
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gave Defendant $185 in cash, and received a copy of the completed invoice (R. 
141:14-16,20-21; State's Exh. 3). Thereafter, the company received an invoice for the 
job which contained the same date, but reflected a different invoice number, 
Defendant's initials, and a total charge of $85.00 (R. 141:15-17,21,64-65; State's Exh. 
4). The signature on the bottom purported to be that of Brenda Dunyon, but was 
not (R. 141:17-18, 21). The invoice on file with the company indicated that $ 85.00 
was received by Air Comfort, and it contained all of the required signatures or 
initials - Defendant's, Nicole's, and Brett's (R. 141:64-65). 
Third Forgery. 
On July 1,2005, Defendant reported to the apartment of Ralph Goff to fix his 
air conditioner (R. 141:34-37, 43-44). When Defendant arrived, Goff jokingly 
commented that he hoped the bill would not be over $ 420 because that's all he had 
(R. 141:37,45). Defendant was unable to fix the air conditioner (R. 141:48,51). After 
several hours of work, the bill totaled $ 431.70, and Defendant reduced it to $ 421.70 
"to give [Goff] a break" (R. 141:36-37, 44-47, 50, 52, 54; State's Exh. 1). Goff paid 
Defendant in cash (R. 141:45, 47). Goff's friend, Mark Norton, was visiting at the 
time (R. 141:35-36,48). He had electrical experience and was generally familiar with 
breaker switches — which was part of the problem with the air conditioner—and the 
general costs of parts (R. 141:35-38, 40-41, 51). Norton believed that some of the 
parts listed on the receipt "seemed overpriced" (R. 141:37-38,45-46; State's Exh. 1). 
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The next day, Norton called Air Comfort to complain (R. 141:37-38,48, 67-68). The 
client fulfillment director, Cory Hansen, discovered in the course of the conversation 
that his paperwork did not seem to match the receipt to which Norton referred (R. 
141:38-39, 55-56, 58, 68). Norton and Goff immediately took their receipt to Air 
Comfort only to discover that the company had been given an invoice containing a 
different number than the one Defendant had given to Goff, reflecting a total charge 
of $122.00, and containing Defendant's initials and a signature that purported to be, 
but was not, that of Ralph Goff (R.141: 38-39, 48-49, 51, 54, 66-68; State's Exh. 2). 
Cory Hansen testified that he was "familiar" with Defendant's handwriting 
and that the description of the work performed "appearjed] to be [Defendant's] 
handwriting" on all three of the discrepant invoices, State's Exhibits 2,4, and 6 (R. 
141:66-67).l 
After his phone conversation with Norton, but before his meeting with both 
Norton and Goff, Hansen contacted Defendant by phone to inform him that there 
was a discrepancy in the paperwork for the work at Goff s apartment (R. 141:69-70). 
Defendant stated that he charged Goff $122.00 and that Goff and Norton were drug 
users and "were lying" when they claimed to have paid him $ 421.00 (R. 141:69-70). 
1
 State's Exhibits 1-6 are attached at Addendum C. 
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Further investigation by Hansen into all cash invoices led to the discovery of 
discrepancies between Vance Hansen's and Brenda Dunyon's written receipts and 
the invoices Defendant submitted to Air Comfort (R. 141:68-69, 71, 75-76). 
After his arrest, Defendant called Cory Hansen, "upse t . . . that police had to 
be involved" (R. 141: 71-72). He told Hansen that there was no need for the police 
because "[I]would have made it right" (R. 141:72). 
The Defendant's case at trial 
Counsel for Defendant established on cross-examination of Cory Hansen that 
Defendant gave all three invoices and the cash payments to Nicole Matheny (R. 
141:80-82, 88). Nicole had a history of "multiple counts on multiple occasions of 
forgery" of which Hansen was previously unaware (R. 141:81-82,88-89; Def. Exh. 1). 
Hansen testified that she simply stopped coming to work within two weeks after the 
charged discrepancies were discovered (R. 141:78-79). Announcing that he had "one 
more question," defense counsel asked Hansen, "If it's not [Defendants 
handwriting it looks like a pretty good imitation, wouldn't you say" (R. 141:89). 
Hansen answered, "I would be" (R. 141:89). Counsel concluded by eliciting from 
Hansen that he would be surprised to learn that Nicole was then imprisoned for 
forgery (R. 141:89). 
In closing, Defense counsel conceded that a forgery had occurred but argued 
that Defendant did not commit it (R. 141:134-38). He argued that the reason the 
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customer signatures on the three invoices were "really close" to the actual 
signatures was that they were done by "an experienced forger[:] . . . Nicole 
Matheny" (R. 141:137-38). The investigation, he claimed, simply did not go beyond 
Defendant to expose her (id.). He offered no explanation or argument for Hansen's 
testimony that Defendant denied being paid more than $ 122.00 for his time at the 
Goff apartment and insisted that Goff and Norton were liars if they claimed 
otherwise (R. 141:69-70). 
As for the theft charges, defense counsel argued that no theft occurred 
"because all the witnesses testified that they were happy with their service, they 
paid the right amount, [and] nobody disputed that" (R. 141:138). 
The rule 23B hearing 
At the 23B hearing, the trial court heard from Mr. Kraft, Defendant's trial 
counsel; Ms. Linda Cropp, a forensic handwriting analyst; and Defendant (R. 274:1-
75). From their testimony, the court made these factual findings: 
2. One of the primary issues at trial was whether Defendant was the 
author of forged [invoice]s which were at issue[—]Exhibits 2, 4, 
and 6 at trial. 
3. Defendant and counsel both testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
they had discussed the possibility of hiring a handwriting expert 
to analyze whether Defendant forged the numbers on the work 
orders. 
4. Defendant asserts that throughout his meetings with counsel, he 
continually asserted that he would like to hire a handwriting 
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expert. Defendant testified that he never relinquished this 
request. 
6. [Cjounsel testified that he and Defendant mutually decided not to 
hire an expert due to (1) the cost of hiring an expert; (2) the 
fact that the State did not intend to present expert testimony; 
and (3) counsel's belief that Defendant's case was sufficiently 
strong without an expert. 
8. The Court credits Defendant's testimony regarding the decision to 
not hire an expert wi tness . . . . [T]he Court finds that Defendant 
and counsel did not mutually decide against hiring an expert 
and that counsel told Defendant that they would not have an 
expert because counsel could not find one. 
9. The Court notes that the credibility determination here is not an 
easy one to make. . . . However, the Court must make a 
determination regarding credibility and that determination 
ultimately balances, though only slightly, in Defendant's favor. 
10. The record is then clear on what happened at trial. Neither the 
State nor Defendant presented expert testimony regarding the 
handwriting on the forged instruments. The only testimony 
presented was that of Defendant's employer who testified, 
without objection, that the handwriting on the forged documents 
looked like Defendant's. No testimony refuted this statement. 
11. Defendant did not testify, based on a strategic decision made by 
Defendant and counsel. 
12. Counsel's primary theory of the case was that another employee 
named Nicole, who had been convicted of forgery and whose 
initials appeared on all the invoices in question, had been 
responsible for the forgery. 
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14. Following Defendant's conviction, his appellate counsel retained 
Ms. Cropp to analyze Exhibits 2, 4, and 6 compared to 
Defendant's handwriting and to form an opinion regarding 
whether Defendant was the author of the forged invoices. 
16. Ms. Cropp testified that as to Exhibit 2, Defendant was "probably 
not" the author and as to Exhibits 4 and 6, Defendant was 
"most probably not" the author. 
17. Short of having observed the actual creation of the invoices, 
"most probably not" was the highest level of certainty 
Ms. Cropp could assign to the invoices against a finding 
that Defendant was the author. 
18. Though handwriting experts do not assign levels of certainty 
based on percentages, Ms. Cropp testified that "most probably 
not written" was akin to over 90% certainty that Defendant was 
not the author. She further stated that "probably not written by" 
equated to approximately 80% or higher certainty that 
Defendant was not the author of the invoices. 
19. The Court finds that, had Ms. Cropp been called to testify at trial, 
she would have testified as she did at the evidentiary hearing. 
20. Additionally, based on Ms. Cropp's testimony, the Court finds that 
it is likely another expert, with similar training and experience, 
would have testified similarly to Ms. Cropp. The Court also 
finds that it is possible that another qualified expert would have 
reached a different conclusion from Ms. Cropp. 
(Findings of Fact, R. 265-67, Addendum B). The court did not make any le 
conclusions (R. 267). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to, or 
challenging the foundation for, the opinion of a director of his company that the 
handwriting on the forged invoices appeared to be Defendant's handwriting. 
Defendant mainly argues that because any determination that the three invoices 
were forged would require "specialized knowledge/7 possessed only by a qualified 
handwriting expert and not by a lay person, "[the director's testimony was in the 
realm of what the jury construed as 'specialized knowledge' and [sic] 
inappropriately relied upon [the director's testimony in its Verdict." 
However, it was the victims who testified that their signatures on the invoices 
Defendant submitted to the company had been forged, not the director. As a 
nonexpert, He testified only that, based on his familiarity with Defendant's 
handwriting, the handwriting on the forged invoices describing the work performed 
appeared to be Defendant's. The jury cannot have regarded a director of a building 
trades company as a handwriting expert. Counsel was not deficient for not 
objecting to Hansen's testimony. Any objection to Hansen's identification of 
Defendant's handwriting on the ground that he was unqualified as an expert 
handwriting analyst would have been denied. Accordingly, counsel was not 
ineffective in not objecting to Hansen's testimony on that ground. 
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Defendant cursorily argues that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting on 
the ground that director was not sufficiently familiar with Defendant's handwriting 
to give an opinion even as a non-expert. Because Defendant cites no relevant rule of 
evidence or any interpretative authority, this claim is inadequately briefed and the 
Court should decline to consider it. In any case, the record shows that the director 
was qualified. Utah is in accord with respected authority, that only slight 
familiarity is sufficient foundation for the identification of handwriting. And here, 
based on the director's familiarity with Defendant's handwriting and his 
demonstrated familiarity with how invoices were handled in the normal course of 
business, the foundation for his testimony was sufficient. Any objection would have 
been futile. 
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently in retaining 
a handwriting analyst to testify, who would have testified, contrary to the director, 
that Defendant was probably not the writer of the forged invoices. The State 
concedes that trial counsel performed deficiently in not calling an analyst. 
However, because evidence of Defendant's guilt was compelling, no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result exists, even if a defense expert had testified. 
Defendant's own testimony confirmed his guilt. Confronted with his 
employer's discovery of a dummy invoice stating a lesser amount than the invoice 
he gave to one of the victims, Defendant insisted that the victim was lying and that 
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the dummy invoice in the company's files was the real one. That is, he insisted that 
he received only $ 122 from the victim, not $420. 
By insisting that the invoices in the company files were genuine, Defendant 
undid his defense. At trial and at all times afterward, Defendant has argued that the 
service coordinator to whom he turned in the invoices was the forger and thief. 
However, by insisting that he received the lesser amounts from the victims and that 
the invoices for those lesser amounts were genuine, he removed all motive for a 
third party to have forged those invoices: in that scenario, there is nothing for the 
putative forger to have stolen. 
Trial counsel admitted at the 23B hearing that this evidence was 
unanswerable. And Defendant essentially acknowledged the same thing when he 
turned his story around for the presentence investigator, giving a statement in 
which he insisted that the victim gave him $ 420. In short, even if counsel had been 
able to exclude the director's identification of his handwriting or introduced expert 
testimony that he did not forge the invoices, Defendant would still have been 
convicted. 
II. 
Defendant has failed to marshal the crucial evidence — his insistence, against 
all plausibility, that he received from the victims the lesser amounts of cash 
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indicated on the forged invoices. Therefore, the Court should decline to consider his 
insufficiency of evidence claim. 
In any case, the evidence to convict Defendant of forgery was sufficient, based 
on the undisputed fact that the invoices he submitted to his employer were forged 
and his incredible insistence that he had received only the amounts of cash 
appearing on the forged invoices. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT 
CHALLENGING A WITNESS'S OPINION IDENTIFYING 
DEFENDANTS HANDWRITING AND IN NOT CALLING A 
HANDWRITING ANALYST 
Defendant claims that Mr. Kraft, his trial counsel, was ineffective in not 
objecting to, or challenging the foundation for, a lay witness's opinion about his 
handwriting. Aplt. Br. at 26-32. He also claims that his counsel was ineffective in 
not hiring a handwriting analyst who would have testified that Defendant was 
probably not the writer of the discrepant invoices submitted to his employer. Aplt. 
Br. at 19-26. The claims fail. 
A. The standard of review. 
"To warrant reversal of a conviction, a defendant alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel must establish both 'that counsel's performance was deficient' 
and that 'the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'" State v. Kelt, 2008 UT 
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62, t 27,194 P.3d 913 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 'To 
prove that counsel7s performance was deficient, the petitioner 'must show that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness/" Id. at f 
28 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Further, a defendant "'must overcome a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.'" State v. Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, \ 20,125 P.3d 103 (quoting 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689)). "[The appellate court] do[es] not 'second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect.'" Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted). "Because of this strong presumption of 
competence, [the appellate court] need not find that counsel followed a specific trial 
strategy; rather, '[the appellate court] need only articulate some plausible strategic 
explanation for counsel's behavior.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 
(Utah App. 1993)). "[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no 
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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B. Defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently in not challenging the foundation for the witness's 
opinion about his handwriting. 
1. Defendant's argument that Air Comfort's client fulfillment 
director was improperly allowed to testify about Defendant's 
handwriting as an expert misapprehends the substance of that 
testimony and the law. 
"Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel/' State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,t 26,1 P.3d 546. The objection Defendant now 
insists his trial counsel should have made at trial would have been futile. 
At trial, Cory Hansen, the client fulfillment director at Air Comfort, testified 
that the written description of the work performed on the three invoices submitted 
to the company "appears to be [in Defendant's] handwriting" (R. 141:67). On 
appeal, Defendant claims that Mr. Kraft was ineffective in "failing to object or 
require that adequate foundation be laid for a lay person to testify as an expert!' 
Aplt. Br. at 26 (heading of Pt. B) (emphasis added). He mainly argues that because 
any determination that the three invoices were forged would require "specialized 
knowledge," possessed only by a qualified handwriting expert and not by a lay 
person, "Cory's testimony was in the realm of what the jury construed as 
'specialized knowledge' and [sic] inappropriately relied upon Cory's testimony in 
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its Verdict." Aplt. Br. at 29-32 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702).2 This argument 
misapprehends the purpose and substance of Hansen's testimony and misapplies 
the law to that testimony. 
The State introduced the testimony of the three victims to show, among other 
facts, that someone had forged the victims' names to the invoices that Defendant 
submitted to the company. The victims were also called to testify that the invoices 
did not reflect the amount of cash each victim had paid Defendant, which was 
reflected on the invoice that Defendant gave to each victim when the work was 
completed and payment was made (R. 18-State's Exh. 4; R. 29-State's Exh. 6; and R. 
49-State's Exh. 2). That testimony and no other was the sole evidence offered to 
show that the invoices submitted to Air Comfort were forgeries. Thus, contrary to 
Defendant's innuendo, the State did not call Cory Hansen to give testimony as to his 
"specialized knowledge" in detecting forgeries. Indeed, he never testified that any 
writing was a forgery. Rather, he simply confirmed that, being familiar with 
Defendant's handwriting from their workplace, the description of the work on the 
invoices appeared to be in Defendant's handwriting (R. 67). Thus, Defendant's 
2
 Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
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invocation of rule 702 to suggest that Mr. Kraft ineffectively failed to object to 
" testimony [] in the realm of what the jury construed as 'specialized knowledge/" — 
["expert testimony"]— is simply misplaced. Moreover, suggesting that the jury 
would have viewed Hansen, a manager in a building trades company with a 
background in health care administration, as an "expert" with "specialized 
knowledge" on handwriting and forgery defies serious consideration (R141:58,73). 
In short, any objection to Hansen's identification of Defendant's handwriting on the 
ground that he was unqualified as an expert handwriting analyst would have been 
denied. Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective in not objecting to Hansen's 
testimony on that ground. 
2. Defendant's argument, that Air Comfort's client fulfillment 
director was improperly allowed to testify about Defendant's 
handwriting as a nonexpert fails because it is inadequately 
briefed and any objection would have been futile. 
Defendant also cursorily claims that Mr. Kraft was ineffective in failing to 
object to, or require that an adequate foundation be laid for, Hansen's opinion that 
the work descriptions on the forged invoices appeared to be in Defendant's 
handwriting. Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant argues that, based on the evidence, Hansen 
was insufficiently familiar with Defendant's handwriting to identify it. Id. 
By its terms, Defendant's argument implicitly relies on rule 901, Utah Rules of 
Evidence: 
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The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
. . . [TJhe following are examples of authentication or identification 
conforming with the requirements of this rule: 
(2) Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, 
based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
Utah R. Evid. 901 (a), -(b) (2). 
In fact, Defendant relied on rule 901 and related case law in moving this Court 
for a rule 23B remand (R. 161-65). However, Defendant on appeal has substantially 
abandoned rule 901 as the legal basis for his claim that Mr. Kraft ineffectively failed 
to challenge Hansen's identification testimony. That is, Defendant has failed to 
provide any meaningful analysis or relevant authority in support of his rule 901 
argument, or a sufficient record in support of that argument. Aplt. Br. at 30. 
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the claim as inadequately briefed and 
speculative. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that 
are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (citing 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where 
Defendant's brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and authority to support his 
argument")). "'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
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with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 
111, 974 P.2d 269 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). See also 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1 7,1 P.3d 1108 (noting inadequacy of appellant's brief 
which failed to provide "meaningful legal analysis" and "merely contained] one or 
two sentences stating his argument generally . . . and then broadly conclude[d] that 
[appellant] is entitled to relief")); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented. . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on."). 
Here, Defendant does not cite to rule 901(b)(2) or discuss any interpretative 
authority that would support his argument that Hansen was unqualified to 
authenticate Defendant's handwriting on the forged invoices. Aplt. Br. at 30. 
Consequently, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on Mr. 
Kraft's failure to challenge Hansen's testimony, is inadequately briefed. This Court 
should, accordingly, decline to consider it. 
"It is 'settled that no great degree of familiarity with handwriting is required 
to render a witness competent to give an opinion. If he has seen the person write a 
single time, it has generally been held sufficient.'" State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,901 
(Utah App. 1996) (quoting State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442,447,85 P. 447,448 (1906)). 
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"The witness need only show some familiarity with the script in question. A 
witness who has had limited opportunities to acquire this familiarity may 
nevertheless testify/' 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S 
EVIDENCE % 901(b)(2)[01] (1994) (citing numerous cases). "[I]t is inconsequential 
[under rule 901(b)(2)] for the trial court's determination whether the nonexpert has 
personally observed the person put pen to paper or exactly how many times the 
nonexpert has actually seen the person's handwriting; such facts go only to the 
weight accorded the evidence by the jury/' Jacques, 924 P.2d at 901 (citing United 
States v. Binzel, 907 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
Defendant argues that Hansen was "not familiar enough to testify as he did 
concerning Draper's handwriting" because he had been employed at Air Comfort 
for only about four months at the time of the incidents and because "the [invoices 
that] contained Draper's and other technicians' handwriting were turned into the 
dispatch service coordinator and [were] not regularly seen by Cory/7 Aplt. Br. at 30. 
This argument fails by its terms, as Defendant impliedly concedes that Hansen did 
see his handwriting on invoices, even if not regularly. However, Hansen evidently 
did see the invoices regularly, as shown by his detailed understanding of how they 
were handled by the technicians and various accounting personnel in the normal 
course of business (R. 141:58-62, 66-67, 76, 81, 83-85). In short, the evidence shows 
that Hansen was sufficiently familiar with Defendant's handwriting to identify it 
and that any objection to the identification would have been futile. Kelley, 2000 UT 
41,1 26. 
Further, given that Hansen's identification of Defendant's handwriting could 
not likely have been excluded, Defendant's trial counsel made a legitimate strategic 
choice to use the identification to advance the defense. This Court has recognized 
that defense counsel may reasonably choose not to object to potentially 
incriminating evidence to advance a legitimate trial strategy. See e.g., State v. 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 1 31, 63 P.3d 110 (rejecting a claim of ineffective 
assistance that failure to object to admission of surveillance video in prosecution for 
aggravated robbery was not deficient performance given that videotape was used as 
part of reasonable trial strategy to support theory that Defendant did not commit 
aggravated robbery). 
Here, the theory of the defense was that Nicole Matheny, the service 
coordinator who received the invoices and cash, and who was a convicted forger, 
forged the second set of invoices—State's Exhibits 2,4, and 6—and skimmed the cash 
in excess of forged amounts (R. 77-82, 134-38). Only Hansen identified the 
handwriting on these invoices as Defendant's. As noted, Hansen's testimony was 
admissible. Mr. Kraft therefore attacked its weight. He elicited from Hansen that he 
might be mistaken about his identification and, at the same time, deftly advanced 
the theory that Nicole was the forger: 
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Q [Mr. Kraft]: A little earlier you had testified you were looking at the 
invoices and you said I'm familiar with Ryan's signature, that looks 
like Ryan's handwriting? 
A [Hansen]: Yes. 
Q: If it's not Ryan's handwriting it looks like a pretty good imitation, 
wouldn't you say. 
A: I would. 
Q: Now, are you aware that Nicole Matheny is currently in prison for 
forgery? Would that be a surprise for you to find out? 
A: It would be. 
Mr. Kraft: Okay. I have no further questions for Mr. Hansen right 
now, Your Honor. 
(R141:89). Mr. Kraft thus effectively implied that the handwriting was not 
Defendant's, but a clever imitation of Defendant's handwriting produced by Nicole 
Matheny. 
In sum, Defendant has failed to show that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently in not objecting to Hansen's identification opinion. As discussed below, 
see Aple. Br. at I.D., even if the Court held that counsel's performance was deficient, 
that deficiency did not prejudice Defendant. 
C. The State concedes that defense counsel was deficient in not 
hiring a handwriting analyst. 
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently in not 
retaining a handwriting analyst to testify, contrary to Cory Hansen, that Defendant 
was probably not the writer of the discrepant invoices submitted to his employer. 
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Aplt. Br. at 23-25. In light of the significance of such expert testimony in a forgery 
case, Defendant argues, counsel's failure to call the expert was prejudicial. Aplt. Br. 
at 25-26. 
The State concedes that defense counsel was deficient in not hiring a 
handwriting analyst. Ms. Cropp, the analyst, testified that at the 23B hearing that 
State's Exhibit 2 "was probably not," and State's Exhibits 4 and 6 were "most 
probably not," written by Defendant (R. 274:34-35). Mr. Kraft acknowledged in the 
23B hearing that an expert's testimony would have been "helpful" (R. 274:9, 25). 
The trial court found that Mr. Kraft did not make substantial efforts to locate Ms. 
Cropp (See Findings, R.266, Addendum B). The court found that Ms. Cropp would 
have testified at trial as she did at the 23B hearing, as likely would another expert 
with similar training and experience (Id. at 267). And the court also found "that it is 
possible that another qualified expert would have reached a different conclusion 
from Ms. Cropp," based on her testimony (Id.; R274:38-39). Notwithstanding this 
last finding, the State does not dispute that Defendant has satisfied Strickland's first 
prong. Nevertheless, Defendant was not prejudiced because evidence of guilt was 
compelling. 
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D. Defendant was not prejudiced by any deficiency in counsel's 
performance, because evidence of guilt was compelling. 
"Failure to satisfy either prong [of the Strickland test] will result in our 
concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective/' State v.. Diaz, 2002 UT App 
288, Tf 38, 55 P.3d 1131. Under the second Strickland prong, Defendant must 
establish prejudice by affirmatively "show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability 
that but for counsel's [ineffectiveness], the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 (Utah 1990) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "In making this determination, an appellate court should 
consider 'the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
Here, even absent any ineffectiveness of counsel in not excluding Hansen's 
identification, or in Mr. Kraft's failure to oppose that identification with an expert's 
opinion, the result would not likely have been different because the verdict is 
strongly supported by the record. Broadly, Defendant cut off any reasonable 
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explanation of his innocence when he denied the validity of the amount of cash he 
collected from one victim, an amount reflected on the invoice he indisputably gave 
to that victim, and thereafter gave the service coordinator an admittedly forged 
invoice indicating a lesser charge. Stated differently, Defendant's denial of 
unchallengable facts of his misdeeds not only exposed his consciousness of guilt, it 
unraveled his defense that he was not, at least, a party to the forgeries. A detailed 
explanation follows. 
Defendant has nowhere disputed the testimony of the three victims, that the 
signatures on three invoices were not theirs (R. 141:17-18, 29, 49). At trial, he 
admitted in closing that State's Exhibits 2,4, and 6 were forgeries (R. 141:134). Nor, 
after being charged, has Defendant ever claimed that any of the three victims lied 
about the amount of cash they gave him for his services. Indeed, Defendant, on 
appeal, affirms his defense at trial, that "he turned in the correct work orders and 
cash given to him by Dunyon, Goff, and Hansen to Matheny . . . ." Aplt. Br. at 35. 
Thus, the only crucial questions at trial were whether it was Defendant or Nicole 
who forged the victims' names to the three invoices and skimmed the cash 
difference between the pair of invoices relating to each of the three victims. 
Defendant has consistently argued that it was not him, but only Nicole Matheny, 
who was responsible for the forgeries and the thefts (R141:81-85,135-38; Aplt. Br. at 
36-37). But undisputed facts upset this theory and expose Defendant's guilt. 
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Defendant performed certain stated work for Goff, charged him $421.70, as 
indicated on the "Air Comfort" invoice that he left with Goff— State's Exhibit 1— 
and collected $420 in cash from him (R. 141:36-37, 44-47, 50, 52, 54). The next day 
and immediately after Goff and Norton complained to him, Cory Hansen went 
through Air Comfort's files (R. 141:37-38, 48, 67-68). There he discovered a 
differently numbered invoice—State's Exhibit 2—identifying different work that 
Defendant had purportedly done for Goff, at a stated cost of $122 (R. 141:55-56,58, 
68). When Hansen confronted Defendant with these discrepancies later that day, 
Defendant insisted that Goff and Norton were lying and that the invoice in the 
company file, State's Exhibit 2, correctly reflected the $122 he had charged and 
received from Goff $122 (R. 69-70). 
In so insisting, Defendant implicitly attacked the validity of the invoice he 
gave to Goff—State's Exhibit 1 - and explicitly vouched for the validity of the invoice 
he submitted to his employer—State's Exhibit 2. But an attack on the validity of 
State's Exhibit 1 asks the trier of fact to believe that Goff, the homeowner, stole an 
Air Comfort invoice while Defendant was working, wrote the description and costs 
of parts and service on the invoice, and then lied under oath, along with Norton, 
about paying Defendant $420 in cash. That is not a very credible explanation. It 
becomes very incredible when Defendant has twice created the same scenario 
within the three preceding months (R. 11, 24; State's Exh. 3-6). See 2 JOHN HENRY 
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WiGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 302, at 241 (Chadboum ed.1979) ("The doctrine 
of chances has been characterized as 'the instinctive recognition of that logical 
process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of 
the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all/") In 
short, Defendant's express insistence that he received only $122 from Goff (State's 
Exh. 2) and his implicit insistence that he also received only the lesser amounts set 
out in the forged invoices relating to the other two victims (State's Exh. 4 and 6), is 
patently unbelievable. 
In similar fashion, Defendant's insistence on the validity of those invoices he 
submitted to his employer inescapably establishes his guilt, at least as a party, for 
the thefts and the forgeries. Following a service call, an Air Comfort technician 
must file a copy of the invoice reflecting his work and turn over the cash he receives 
to the service coordinator (R. 141:58-61). The only way to cover a theft of cash is to 
turn over a lesser amount of the cash than was collected from the client, along with 
a dummy invoice reflecting that lesser amount. An invoice submitted in this fashion 
is necessarily fraudulent and where, as in this case, it bears the name of the client, it 
is a forgery. See Aple. Br. at II. Here, only Defendant, not Nicole, had the motive to 
forge the documents because only he took the cash from the victims. Even if Nicole 
for some reason forged the invoices Defendant submitted to her, that fact could not 
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absolve Defendant of the charged offenses. He obtained the cash that motivated the 
forgeries, and so was necessarily complicit in the scheme. 
Further, Defendant's insistence that the invoices he submitted to his employer 
were genuine nullified his defense. By arguing that the invoices correctly identified 
the amount of cash he gave to Nicole, he denied that Nicole had a motive to commit 
forgery. That insistence also confused the defense. The theory of the defense at 
every stage — at trial, in the 23B hearing, and on appeal— has consistently been that 
the invoices retained by tlte victims were genuine and that the invoices submitted to 
the company were forgeries committed by Nicole. The Nicole-as-the-forger theory, 
however, only makes sense if Defendant did receive the greater amounts charged on 
the invoices from the victims (State's Exh. 1,3, and 5) and turned those amounts into 
the company, followed by Nicole's writing the invoices found in the company files 
and skimming the excess off for herself. In other words, Defendant's insistence that 
he received only the lesser amounts from the victims is hopelessly inconsistent with 
the theory that Nicole was the thief and the forger in this case. 
The significance of Defendant's insistence on the genuineness of the invoices 
he submitted to his employer cannot be overestimated. In closing rebuttal at trial, 
the prosecutor focused on Defendant's insistence that he did receive only $122 from 
Goff: 
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[A]nd this is probably the most important piece of evidence that 
I want you to be considering when you are deciding all this, and this is 
the conversation between Cory Hansen and the Defendant after Mr. 
Goff and Mr. Norton complained. And that's where the Defendant 
insisted to Cory Hansen that he had charged Mr. Goff $122, the amount 
that corresponds to the document that we have been talking about. We 
know that the Defendant did it, and not somebody else, because he 
insisted that he did do it, basically. He insisted that he got $122 from 
Mr. Goff, which matches Invoice No. 4079 [State's Exhibit 2], and he 
said basically those guys are lying. I never took their $421. But they 
had this receipt [—State's Exhibit 1]. That's what I want you to be 
thinking about when your are deciding did Defendant do it. 
(R. 141:140-41). 
At the 23B hearing, Mr. Kraft testified that the reason that Defendant did not 
take the stand was that there was testimony presented in the State's case "that I 
didn't think we had a reasonable answer for . . . ." (R. 274:28). Although counsel 
was not specific, the reference is certainly to Hansen's testimony that Defendant 
insisted that he had collected only $122 from Goff. 
Finally, the jury heard from Hansen that Defendant essentially admitted the 
offenses. After his arrest, Defendant called Hansen, "upse t . . . that police had to be 
involved" (R. 141: 71-72). He told Hansen that there was no need for the police 
because "[Defendant] would have made it right" (R. 141:72). 
In sum, undisputed evidence at trial, which the defense recognized as 
unanswerable and damaging, not only firmly established Defendant's guilt, it 
nullified his defense that Nicole Matheny was the sole criminal actor in this case. 
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Exclusion of Cory Hansen's identification of Defendant's handwriting, or 
introduction of expert testimony that Defendant was not the forger would not have 
resulted in an acquittal or a hung jury. Indeed, rather than altering the "entire 
evidentiary picture" in his favor, excluding Hansen's identification testimony or 
introducing expert testimony would likely have led the jury to conclude that 
Defendant and Nicole, given her criminal background as a forger, were acting 
together.3 In sum, Defendant has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
3
 Defendant's acquittal on all theft charges is logically inconsistent with the 
guilty verdict for all the forgery charges. A plausible explanation for jury 
nullification on the theft charges is that the jury may well have concluded that 
Nicole Matheny did play a role in the offenses. Accordingly, they may have 
believed that she should share the burden of guilt, but because she was not charged, 
defendant should not shoulder the full burden of guilt. Notwithstanding the 
irrationality of defendant's acquittal on the theft charges, the evidence of his guilt 
for forgery is compelling. See State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah,1986) ("A 
criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error 
by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence ") (quoting United 
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1984) (inconsistent verdicts do not equate to 
insufficient evidence)); State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134-35 (Utah App. 1994) 
(same). 
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II. 
THE COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE WHERE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE CRUCIAL FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT; IN ANY 
CASE, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR FORGERY 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
convictions for forgery. Aplt. Br. at 32-37. He first asserts that he has marshaled the 
evidence, referencing his factual statement. He then recites facts that tend to show 
he acted innocently: his satisfactory repair of Dunyon's air conditioner and 
Hansen's furnace, the sums of cash the victims gave to him, his handling of their 
receipts, which accurately reflected those sums, his giving Goff "a [$10.00] break" on 
the bill, and Cory Hansen's testimony that technicians turned invoices in to Nicole 
Matheny. Aplt. Br. at 34-35. Defendant does, however, marshal that Cory Hansen 
testified that the handwriting on the invoices in Air Comfort's files — State's Exhibits 
2,4, and 6 — was, in his opinion, Defendant's. Aplt. Br. at 35. Defendant then argues 
that the evidence did not conclusively show he was the forger, in light of Nicole's 
position as service coordinator and her criminal record for forgery-related crimes, 
and Hansen's lack of qualifications to identify a forgery. Aplt. Br. at 35-37. 
" A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Such a burden is 
indeed significant, and requires [a defendant] to marshal the evidence in support of 
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the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Prichett, 2003 UT 24, f 25, 69 P.3d 
1284 (internal citation and quotation omitted). "Counsel must extricate himself or 
herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position," by 
presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991). 
Then, after gathering "this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. A reviewing court will decline to 
address the merits of a claim that the evidence was insufficient where the defendant 
notably failed to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 25, 989 P.2d 503. 
Defendant has notably failed to satisfy the marshaling requirement. Rather 
than marshaling the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, he recites the evidence 
favorable to his position, albeit with the acknowledgment that Cory Hansen 
identified his handwriting on the forged invoices. But Defendant has failed to 
marshal the most incriminating testimony in the State's case: that while declaring 
his innocence within a day of servicing Goff's air conditioner, he insisted that he had 
collected only $122, when all the evidence showed that he had collected $420, the 
fact which was completely at odds with his defense and which firmly established 
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his guilt. See Aple. Br. at I.D. The Court should for this reason decline to consider 
Defendant's insufficiency claim. In any case, the evidence is sufficient. 
"When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is 
insufficient,... '[w]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdictf, and w]e reverse.. . only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted/" State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, 
f 15,167 P.3d 503 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)). 
To convict Defendant of forgery, the State was required to show, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Defendant, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud, made, completed, issued, or uttered the 
invoices he submitted to his employer so that those invoices purported to be the acts 
of the three victims in this case. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (2)(b)(i) (West 
Supp. 2008). 
It is undisputed that the invoices Defendant submitted to his employer — 
State's Exhibits 2,4, and 6 — bore signatures of the victims that were not genuine (R. 
141:17-18, 29, 49, 134). It is also undisputed that the invoices retained by the 
victims — State's Exhibits 1,3, and 5—reflected their payment to Defendant of larger 
amounts of cash than was reflected on State's Exhibits 2,4, and 6 (R. 141:141:14-16, 
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20-21, 26-28, 32-33, 36-37, 44-47, 50, 52, 54; State's Exh. 1, 3, and 5). Thus, the 
evidence is compelling that State's Exhibits 2,4, and 6 were forged with the purpose 
of defrauding Air Comfort. The only remaining question is whether the evidence is 
sufficient to prove that Defendant is the forger. As argued at length above, see Aple. 
Br. at 28-35, the evidence firmly establishes that Defendant is guilty of forgery, if not 
individually, then as an accomplice. In short, the evidence is sufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted March 5, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 2 8 2007 
—ooOoo 
S t a t e of Utah , 
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l e e , 
v . 
Ryan Drape r , 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Case No. 20070159-CA 
Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thorne. 
This appeal is before the court on a motion for remand under 
rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to remand is granted 
and the matter is remanded to the district court for an 
evidentiary hearing for the limited purpose of entering findings 
of fact relevant to the determination of whether trial counsel's 
actions in failing to call an expert witness constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
DATED this JJS day of August, 2007. 
FOR THE COURT: 
C a r o l y n B . McHugh, Judc£&) 
ft the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
full, true and correct copy of an original document 
on file in the Utah Court of Appeals. In testimony 
have set my hand and affixed the seal of 
dujaoJ> CoJX*~rw*J 
isa Collins 
erk oi tfWCourt {LAJ^AA* 
Deputy ClerJ 
Date 
%jhi 
m 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
By. 
F1LEH DeSTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 1 h 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
" Deputy Clerk v 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RYAN LEON DRAPER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Case No. 051905149 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Date: July 14,2008 
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals for the limited puipose of 
entering findings of fact regarding counsel's failure to call an expert witness at trial. Based upon an 
evidentiary hearing held on June 6, 2008, the Court enters the following findings of fact: 
1. Defendant retained Mr. Kraft ("counsel") to represent him when Defendant was charged with three 
counts of forgery and three counts of theft by deception. 
2. One of the primary issues at trial was whether Defendant was the author of forged work orders which 
were at issue; Exhibits 2, 4, and 6 at trial. 
3. Defendant and counsel both testified at the evidentiary hearing that they had discussed the possibility 
of hiring a handwriting expert to analyze whether Defendant forged the numbers on the work orders. 
4. Defendant asserts that throughout his meetings with counsel, he continually asserted that he would 
like to hire a handwriting expert. Defendant testified that he never relinquished this request. 
5. Defendant also testified that he did not have an expert testify at trial because counsel told him that 
he been unable to find an expert. Defendant said that he asked if he could do anything personally 
to find an expert. Counsel told Defendant that counsel had done everything possible to find an 
expert. 
6. Conversely, counsel testified that he and Defendant mutually decided not hire an expert due to (1) 
the cost of hiring an expert; (2) the fact that the State did not intend to present expert testimony; and 
(3) counsel's belief that Defendant's case was sufficiently strong without an expert. 
7. Counsel also testified that he had always been able to find an expert and had never indicated to the 
contrary to Defendant or anyone else. Counsel specifically stated that he had spoken with Ms. 
Cropp, a handwriting expert, regarding another case and could have consulted her in this case if 
necessary. 
8. The Court credits Defendant's testimony regarding the decision to not hire an expert witness to 
testify at trial for two reasons. First, counsel's testimony is inconsistent with Ms. Cropp's. Ms. 
nifiln 
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Cropp testified that she kept meticulous records of all phone calls she received and that she did not 
have a record of counsel contacting her at all during the relevant time period. Second, Defendant 
seemed more certain in his memory of events than did counsel. Therefore, the Court finds that 
Defendant and counsel did not mutually decide against hiring an expert and that counsel told 
Defendant that they would not have an expert because counsel could not find one. 
9. The Court notes that the credibility determination here is not an easy one to make. The Court does 
not believe that either party was deliberately trying to mislead the Court in reciting their different 
versions of events. Additionally, the Court finds that each party sincerely believed that the events 
had happened the way each depicted them. However, the Court must make a determination 
regarding credibility and that determination ultimately balances, though only slightly, in Defendant's 
favor. 
10. The record is then clear on what happened at trial. Neither the State nor Defendant presented expert 
testimony regarding the handwriting on the forged instruments. The only testimony presented was 
that of Defendant's employer who testified, without objection, that the handwriting on the forged 
documents looked like Defendant's. No testimony refuted this statement. 
11. Defendant did not testify, based on a strategic decision made by Defendant and counsel. 
12. Counsel's primary theory of the case was that another employee named Nicole ,who had been 
convicted of forgery and whose initials appeared on all the invoices in question, had been responsible 
for the forgery. 
13. Defendant was convicted of three counts of forgery, third degree felonies. He was acquitted of the 
misdemeanor theft by deception charges. 
14. Following Defendant's conviction, his appellate counsel retained Ms. Cropp to analyze Exhibits 2, 
4, and 6 compared to Defendant's handwriting and to form an opinion regarding whether Defendant 
was the author of the forged invoices. 
15. Ms. Cropp testified at the evidentiary hearing that she had compared Defendant's handwriting 
samples with the handwriting on the invoices. 
16. Ms. Cropp testified that as to Exhibit 2, Defendant was "probably not" the author and as to Exhibits 
4 and 6, Defendant was "most probably not" the author. 
17. Short of having observed the actual creation of the invoices, "most probably not" was the highest 
level of certainty Ms. Cropp could assign to the invoices against a finding that Defendant was the 
author. 
18. Though handwriting experts do not assign levels of certainty based on percentages, Ms. Cropp 
testified that "most probably not written by" was akin to over 90% certainty that Defendant was not 
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the author. She further stated that "probably not written by" equated to approximately 80% or higher 
certainty that Defendant was not the author of the invoices. 
19. The Court finds that, had Ms. Cropp been called to testify at trial, she would have testified as she 
testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
20. Additionally, based on Ms. Cropp's testimony, the Court finds that it is likely another expert, with 
similar training and experience, would have testified similarly to Ms. Cropp. The Court also finds 
that it is possible that another qualified expert would have reached a different conclusion from Ms. 
X3I«1 
Addendum C 
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SERVICES TO PERFORM 
SR ESA JOB CBK S WAR 1 WAR 1 
• a a a a • 
1 1 
1 PAYMENT METHOD: O CASH Q CHECK Q BANK CARD 1 HAVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER J 
1 THE ABOVE WORK. 1 AGREE TO I 
1 THE TERMS SET FORTH BELOW. J 
1 AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE DATE 
1 EQUIPMENT TYPE 
i "" 
J 
MAKE MODEL 
UNIT# 1 
SERIAL NUMBER 1 YR | 
1 DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED: 
ESA SAVINGS $ 
PARTS 
J CODE QUAN. REPAIR CODE DESCRIPTION 
* oMttA&r* 
c rtu-t £>**•-fas 
i»^o 'T^A^-o 
? ' 
PART # UNIT PRICE 
1 Tech Hrs. _______ 
I T H T A I n c n n i n o A K i n c » c n \ / i r k C O _ 
I U I A l -. n c : r ~ / j L i n o M I N U o c n V I V / C : o — m 
TQJAL 
HI 
\M 
2 > 
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\ 
Vii 
MS 
«>*» 
Wi 
1 
ACCT NUMBER 
PO NUMBER 
JOB NUMBER cool people hot service 
40 7 4 
145 WEST 2 9 5 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115 
P H : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 8 3 
F A X : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 4 1 
8 0 0 . 7 4 8 . 4 2 2 6 
WORK ORDER # 
DATE 
JOB FINISHED 
YES NO 
BILLTO_ ATT:. PHONE. 
ADDRESS. CITY, ZIP. 
JOB LOCATION . PHONE. 
Our Trained Service Personnel Recommends: 
ALL ON Q CLEANED • FILTER X X 
Thank You 
for this 
opportunity 
to serve 
you! 
SERVICE PERFORMED 
Diagnostic Fee 
Repairs Total 
Energy Savings Agreement 
Total Billed 
Total Received 
BC/CK# 
^S 
^1 / 
t / t 
iOI 
2i 
EXP 
TERMS: Payment in full shall be made on or before the 10th day of the month following receipt of services 
rendered L:;.!ess otherwise noted. Purchaser agrees to pay 2% per month interest (24% annual percentage rate) 
charge on any past due amounts as well as all costs including reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the provisions 
of this agreement. It is mutually agreed that Air Comfort shall retain and hereby is granted a security interest in the 
above-described equipment or material until the payment herein provided for is paid in full and that said equipment 
shall remain as personal property notwithstanding an installation connection or attachment to realty. In case of 
default by the purchaser under this agreement, Air Comfort may proceed to collect amount owing and/or take 
possession of such. In the event of default by purchaser, Air Comfort shall be relieved of all obligations to 
purchaser, including but not limited to performance of warranty service until the default is cured. 
TFPI - IM i r iAM 
- i / t f 
SERVICES TO PERFORM ^ o 
ESA JOB CBK SWAR' I WAR 
Q a a a 
Isb Ctyvl 
PAYMENT METHOD : ^ J O A S H a CHECK Q BANK CARD I HAVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER 
THE ABOVE WORK. I AGREE TO 
THE TERMS SET FORTH BELOW. 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE DATE 
UNIT# 
EQUIPMENT TYPE MAKE MODEL SERIAL NUMBER YR 
JkJu L Ov s\ Ji ^ m ii $%n z 
u 
LJ 
DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED: 
Crt^ &f^}^ 
REPAIRS AND SERVICES 
4079 
145 WIST 2 9 5 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAVE CITY, UT 84115 
P H : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 8 3 
F A X : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 4 1 
cool people hot service 8 0 0 . 7 4 8 . 4 2 2 6 
WORK ORDERS 
DATE 
mM\ 
m 
\.}. I.J 
JOB FINISHED 
YES 
^ T 
NO 
B I L L T O _ 
ADDRESS 
PHONE tjfk &*ff ATT: 
IHll w yaps ^rV& £LC 
^SzvA 
ZIP. 
JOB LOCATION PHONE. 
Our Trained Service Personnel Recommends: 
ALL ON Q CLEANED Q FILTER X X 
Thank You 
for this 
opportunity 
to serve 
you! 
SERVICE PERFORMED 
Diagnostic Fee 
Repairs Total 
iJT 
23L 
Energy Savings Agreement 
Total Billed 
Total Received 
BC/CK# j^ii. 
J2_Z 
0 0 
VD 
n^z. 
u 0 
o) 
EXP 
TERMS: Payment in full shall be made on or. before the 10th day of the month following receipt of services 
rendeied i::.'ess otherwise noted. Purchaser agrees to pay 2% per month interest (24% annual percentage rate) 
charge on any past due amounts as well as all costs including reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the provisions 
of this agreement. It is mutually agreed that Air Comfort shall retain and hereby is granted a security interest in the 
above-described equipment or material until the payment herein provided for is paid in full and that said equipment 
shall remain as personal property notwithstanding an installation connection or attachment to realty. In case of 
default by the purchaser under this agreement, Air Comfort may proceed to collect amount owing and/or take 
possession of such. In the event of default by purchaser, Air Comfort shall be relieved of all obligations to 
purchaser, including but not limited to performance of warranty service until thejjefault is cured. 
7 ¥' V 2 ^ TECHNICIAN 
SERVICES TO PERFORM SR.-< ESA JOB CBK S WAR I WAR 
..•' 0 0 0 0 0 
PAYMENT METHOD: Q CASH Q CHECK Q BANK CARD I HAVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER 
THE ABOVE WORK. I AGREE TO 
THE TERMS SET FORTH BELOW. 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE 
UNIT# 
EQUIPMENT TYPE MAKE MODEL SERIAL NUMBER YR 
r-0 
rr 
DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED: 
J--* I rt . 
ESA SAVINGS $. 
PARTS 
CODE QUAN. REPAIR CODE DESCRIPTION PART # 
UNIT 
PRICE TOTAL 
cMMpbtA m-°° CJOUQL , 
114 dk AJ////AA-, t 
h±k rAj J>*k j'jnt- J r 
JUL /iLcV^ 
^k 
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Tech Hrs. 
TOTAL REPAIRS AND SERVICES • • 
ACCT NUMBER 
PO NUMBER 
JOB NUMBER 
[gir comfort 
coo! people hot service 
406 4 
145 WEST 2 9 5 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841 15 
P H : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 8 3 
F A X : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 4 1 
8 0 0 . 7 4 8 . 4 2 2 6 
WORK ORDER # 
DATE 
JOB FINISHED 
YES MO 
BILLTO_ J ATT: PHONE. 
ADDRESS CITY ZIP. 
JOB LOCATION PHONE. 
Our Trained Service Personnel Recommends: 
ALL ON Q CLEANED Q FILTER X X 
Thank You 
for this 
opportunity 
to serve 
you! 
SERVICE PERFORMED 
Diagnostic Fee 
Repairs Total 
Energy Savings Agreement 
Total EJilled 
Total Received 
BC/CK# EXP 
TERMS: Payment in full shall be made on or before the 10th day of the month following receipt of services 
rendered -j-'ess otherwise noted. Purchaser agrees to pay 2% per month interest (24% annual percentage rate) 
charge on any past due amounts as well as all costs including reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the provisions 
of this agreement. It is mutually agreed that Air Comfort shall retain and hereby is granted a security interest in the 
above-described equipment or material until the payment herein provided for is paid in full and that said equipment 
shall remain as personal property notwithstanding an installation connection or attachment to realty. In case of 
default by the purchaser under this agreement, Air Comfort may proceed to collect amount owing and/or take 
possession of such. In the event of default by purchaser, Air Comfort shall be relieved of all obligations to 
purchaser, including but not limited to performance of warranty service until the default is cured. 
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CT ESA JOB a • 
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a 
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• 
PAYMENT METHOD: W ) A S H Q CHECK Q BANK CARD 
] x AUTHORIZED SIGNATUffi 
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THE ABOVE WORK. I AGREE TO 
THE TERMS SET FORTH BELOW. 
i&^N^ UNIT# 
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U 
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F ^ 
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T O T A L : P A 1 R S A N D S E R V I C E S 
U o i) 
hot service 
145 WEST 2950 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115 
PH: 80 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 83 
FAX:80 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 4 1 
8 0 0 . 7 4 8 . 4 2 2 6 
WORK ORDER # 
DATE 
/ n o ^  
JOB FINISHED 
YES NO 
BILL TO 
ADDRESS 
JOB LOCATION 
r t n J c ^ (/Ony** AH: PHONE. 
PHONE. 
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A L L O N J ^ CLEANED • FILTER /dxZ^i 
Thank You 
for this 
opportunity 
to serve 
you! 
SERVICE PERFORMED 
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Repairs Total 
Energy Savings Agreement 
Total Billed 4 
Total Received 
BC/CK# 
^ J S f-f 
3~~ 
TT 
%J> 
t)b 
0 0 
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TERMS: Payment in full shall be made on or before the 10th day of the month following receipt of services 
rendered • 'ess otherwise noted. Purchaser agrees to pay 2% per month interest (24% annual percentage rate) 
charge on any past due amounts as well as all costs including reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the provisions 
of this agreement. It is mutually agreed that Air Comfort shall retain and hereby is granted a security interest in the 
above-described equipment or material until the payment herein provided for is paid in full and that said equipment 
shall remain as personal property notwithstanding an installation connection or attachment to realty. In case of 
default by the purchaser under this agreement, Air Comfort may proceed to collect amount owing and/or take 
possession of such. In the event of default by purchaser, Air Comfort shall be relieved of all obligations to 
purchaser, including but not limited to performance of warranty service until the default is cured. 
7" l- 2A_ TECHNICIAN / CUSTOMER \hila(M 
SERVICES TO PERFORM 
SR ESA JOB CBK S WAR I WAR 
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'U ffesp 
PAYMENT METHOD: • CASH U CHECK • BANK CARD I HAVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER 
THE ABOVE WORK. I AGREE TO 
THE TERMS SET FORTH BELOW. 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE 
UNIT# 
EQUIPMENT TYPE 
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^ 
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DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED: 
i-c^f 
ACCT NUMBER 
PO NUMBER 
JOB NUMBER 
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cool people hot service 
J- M u / 
145 WEST 2 9 5 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115 
P H : 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 8 3 
F A X . - 8 0 1 . 4 6 6 . 3 5 4 1 
8 0 0 . 7 4 8 . 4 2 2 6 
WORK ORDER # 
DATE 
H ^0 0& 
JOB FINISHED 
YES NO 
X 
BILLTO_ 
ADDRESS, 
S^-^w ATT: 
syt> "S**l A<^ CITY J^<-
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ZIP. 
JOB LOCATION PHONE. 
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<U 
r±£. 
ALLON j f t L CLEANED • FILTER U X~*r5Xl 
Thank You 
for this 
opportunity 
to serve 
you! 
SERVICE PERFORMED 
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Energy Savings Agreement 
Total Billed 
Total Received XP A £ 3 J NH 
BC/CK# ikL 
^ 2 : 
1ST 
* to 
Ql> 
*b 
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TERMS: Payment in full shall be made on or before the 10th day of the month following receipt of services 
rendered unless otherwise noted. Purchaser agrees to pay 2% per month interest (24% annual percentage rate) 
charge on any past due amounts as well as all costs including reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the provisions 
of this agreement. It is mutually agreed that Air Comfort shall retain and hereby is granted a security interest in the 
above-described equipment or material until the payment herein provided for is paid in full and that said equipment 
shall remain as personal property notwithstanding an installation connection or attachment to realty. In case of 
default by the purchaser under this agreement, Air Comfort may proceed to collect amount owing and/or take 
possession of such. In the event of default by purchaser, Air Comfort shall be relieved of all obligations to 
purchaser, including but not limited to performance of warranty service until the default is cured. 
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DATE 
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Energy Savings Agreement 
Total Billed 
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TERMS: Payment in full shall be made on or before the 10th day of the month following receipt of services 
rendered unless otherwise noted. Purchaser agrees to pay 2% per month interest (24% annual percentage rate) 
charge on any past due amounts as well as all costs including reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the provisions 
of this agreement. It is mutually agreed that Air Comfort shall retain and hereby is granted a security interest In the 
above-described equipment or material until the payment herein provided for is paid in full and that said equipment 
shall remain as personal property notwithstanding an installation connection or attachment to realty. In case of 
default by the purchaser under this agreement, Air Comfort may proceed to collect amount owing and/or take 
possession of such. In the event of default by purchaser, Air Comfort shall be relieved of all obligations to 
purchaser, including but not limited to performance of warranty service until the default is cured. 
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